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Necessities	and	luxuries:	how	to	combine	redistribution	with	sustainable	
consumption	
	
	
Ian	Gough	
	
Chapter	in	What’s	Next	for	Sustainable	Development	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 2	
Introduction	
	
Sustainable	development	is	development	that	meets	the	needs	of	the	present	without	
compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	their	own	needs.	It	contains	within	it	
two	key	concepts:	1)	the	concept	of	‘needs’,	in	particular	the	essential	needs	of	the	world’s	
poor,	to	which	overriding	priority	should	be	given;	and	2)	the	idea	of	limitations.	(Brundtland	
Report,	WCED	1987:	43)	
The	Brundtland	Report	has	bequeathed	the	most	quoted	definition	of	sustainable	
development,	one	that	persists	to	this	day.	It	quite	properly	puts	the	concept	of	‘needs’	at	
its	centre	but,	remarkably,	says	nothing	more	about	what	needs	are,	their	ontological	
character,	how	they	can	be	defined	in	particular	social	contexts,	or	how	their	satisfaction	
can	be	robustly	measured	across	diferent	contexts.	The	first	part	of	this	paper	briefly	
summarises	some	key	features	of	a	theory	of	human	need	and	demonstrates	its	relevance	to	
contemporary	debates	about	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals.	
The	second	part	introduces	inequality,	both	between	and	within	nations,	and	its	central	role	
in	shaping	responsibility	for,	and	the	impacts	of,	climate	change.	Some	have	labeled	the	
intermeshing	of	hyper-inequality	with	the	reality	of	the	Anthropocene	the	Plutocene	(Ulvila	
and	Wilen	2017).	The	relationships	between	inequality	and	unsustainability	are	not	simple	
and	I	discuss	four	contradictory	issues	here.	To	conclude	I	sketch	out	how	national	social	
policies	must	transform	into	eco-social	policies	if	justice	is	to	be	successfuly	pursued.	
	
The	third	part	turns	to	the	patterns	and	growth	of	consumption	in	rich	countries,	the	missing	
piece	of	the	climate	mitigation	jigsaw.	It	makes	the	case	for	fairly	recomposing	consumption	
and	supports	the	idea	of	a	consumption	corridor	bounded	by	minimum	and	maximum	
incomes	or	consumption	bundles.	To	do	this	the	distinction	between	‘necessities’	and	
‘luxuries’	must	be	resurrected.	I	discuss	how	this	might	be	practicaly	achieved	in	a	
democratic	society	using	forms	of	deliberative	dialogue.	I	then	go	on	to	propose	three	
further	national-level	eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	in	a	fair	way.	
	
	
1.	Human	needs,	the	SDGs	and	necessary	emissions	
	
The	concept	of	need	is	central	to	the	Brundtland	project.	It	would	not	make	sense	for	the	
Brundtland	report	to	have	written	‘Sustainable	development	is	development	that	meets	the	
wants/preferences	of	the	present	without	compromising	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	
meet	their	own	wants	or	preferences’.	The	wants	of	people	have	no	definable	limits,	whilst	
by	definition	the	preferences	of	future	generations	cannot	be	known.	The	emphasis	on	
needs	in	the	report	is	welcome	–	but	it	says	nothing	more	about	what	needs	are.	I	have	
argued	consistently	that	we	need	a	theory	of	human	need	to	fil	this	gap	and	to	chalenge	
the	hegemonic	theory	of	welfare	today	–	welfare	economics	and	preference	satisfaction.	
This	theory	is	set	out	in	the	folowing	places	and	is	brutaly	summarized	here	in	four	
theorems	(Doyal	and	Gough	1991,	and	Gough	2015,	2017a	and	2017b).1	
	
																												
1	Holden	et	al	(2018)	provide	a	concise	summary	of	much	of	the	literature	on	needs	in	
chapter	2	of	their	book.		
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Human	needs	are	universal.	Al	individuals,	everywhere	in	the	world,	at	al	times	present	and	
future,	have	certain	basic	needs.	These	must	be	met	in	order	for	people	to	avoid	harm,	to	
participate	in	society	and	to	reflect	criticaly	upon	the	conditions	in	which	they	find	
themselves.	This	is	not	the	same	as	subjective	feelings	like	anxiety	or	unhappiness.	It	refers	
to	functions	not	feelings.	Human	needs	possesses	five	theoretical	features	that	aid	us	in	
identifying	sustainable	welbeing:	they	are	objective,	plural,	non-substitutable,	satiable	and	
cross-generational.		
	
These	features,	especialy	the	last,	are	of	great	importance	to	the	Brundtland	framework	
since	environmental	limits	wil	progressively	impose	dilemmas	of	intergenerational	equity.	
We	can	assert	with	much	confidence	that	the	basic	needs	of	future	generations	of	humans	
wil	be	the	same	as	those	of	present	humans.	To	avoid	serious	harm	and	to	participate	and	
act	within	future	human	societies	people	wil	require	the	same	preconditions:	not	just	
survival,	but	health	and	critical	autonomy.	This	amounts	to	a	remarkable	–	and	pretty	
obvious	–	degree	of	knowledge	about	the	constituents	of	future	peoples’	welbeing.	
Compared	to	the	indeterminacy	of	future	generations’	preferences	or	happiness	-	or	of	Sen’s	
capabilities	-	a	theory	of	need	provides	some	firm	foundations	on	which	to	build	
sustainability	targets	for	public	policy.	
	
Universal	needs	difer	from	specific	‘need	satisfiers’.	In	a	critical	epistemological	shift,	
universal	needs	must	be	distinguished	from	need	satisfiers	which	are	variable	and	local.	
Need	satisfiers	comprise	the	goods,	services,	activities	and	relationships	that	contribute	to	
need	satisfaction	in	any	particular	context.	The	needs	for	food	and	shelter	apply	to	al	
peoples,	but	there	are	a	large	variety	of	cuisines	and	forms	of	dweling	that	can	meet	any	
given	specification	of	nutrition	and	protection	from	the	elements.	It	is	essential	to	draw	a	
sharp	distinction	between	universal	needs	and	specific	satisfiers.	Without	it,	need	theory	
could	justly	be	accused	of	being	paternalist,	intrusive	and	insensitive	to	context	and	culture.	
The	set	of	need	satisfiers	in	a	social	context	can	be	caled	necessities.	This	sets	up	a	
distinction	between	necessities	and	‘luxuries’	or	surplus	goods.	
	
Need	discourse	directly	chalenges	consumer	preferences	in	a	way	that	is	provocative	and	
dificult.	How	can	such	a	discourse	be	pursued	in	a	democratic	society?	I	argue	this	can	only	
be	achieved	by	forms	of	dialogic	democracy,	such	as	citizen	forums,	which	bring	together	
citizens	and	experts	in	a	space	as	open,	as	democratic,	and	as	free	of	vested	interests	as	
possible.	To	identify	social	need	satisfiers	entails	a	system	shift	from	aggregating	
preferences	to	solving	colective	problems.	Need	satisfiers	wil	be	identified	in	a	conscious	
colective	process	–	quite	diferent	to	the	isolated,	individual	process	of	revealing	
preferences	in	markets.		
	
Prioritising	needs	entails	rethinking	social	preconditions.	We	can	then	begin	to	think	through	
what	political,	economic	and	social	institutions	would	better	facilitate	meeting	needs	and	
‘safeguard	the	ability	of	future	generations	to	meet	their	own	needs’.	In	O’Neil’s	(2011,	p.	
33)	words:	‘Each	generation	needs	to	pass	down	the	conditions	for	livelihood	and	good	
health,	for	social	afiliation,	for	the	development	of	capacities	for	practical	reasoning,	for	
engaging	with	the	wider	natural	world	and	so	on’.	This	paper	does	not	address	these	issues	
except	for	some	suggestions	in	the	last	part.	But	I	believe	it	can	help	clarify	the	bewildering	
complexity	of	the	Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs)	adopted	by	the	UN	in	2015.		
	
The	SDGs	provide	a	colective	global	view	of	the	social,	economic	and	political	preconditions	
for	sustainable	development.	This	ambition	has	been	described	as	‘breath-taking’:	a	list	of	
seventeen	goals	and	169	targets,	it	is	arguably	the	most	comprehensive	global	agenda	
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adopted	since	the	UN	Charter	in	1945.	Yet	the	SDGs	muddle	up	the	distinction	between	
needs	and	societal	and	institutional	preconditions	for	need	satisfaction.	There	is	a	strong	
case	for	separating	out	concepts	and	measures	pertaining	to	individuals	and	concepts	and	
measures	pertaining	to	colectivities.	Examples	of	the	first	are	nutrition,	health	and	
education;	examples	of	the	second	are	gender	equality,	sustainability,	inclusiveness	and	
peace.	The	latter	cannot	apply	to	an	individual;	the	former	can.	Some	of	the	concerns	
surrounding	the	SDGs	might	be	assuaged	if	this	distinction	is	clarified	(see	Gough	2017b:	53-
56	for	details).	
	
Need	satisfiers	cannot	be	simply	translated	into	‘necessary	emissions’.	Assuming	a	list	of	
necessities	can	be	drawn	up	for	a	particular	society	at	a	particular	time,	can	we	then	
measure	their	environmental	impacts	to	determine	how	sustainable	they	are?	In	terms	of	
climate	change	can	we	reason	from	need	satisfactions	to	necessary	emissions?	The	short	
answer	is	that	there	is	no	linear	relationship	between	the	two,	indeed	much	climate	policy	is	
designed	to	transform	this	relationship.	Drawing	on	comparative	research	I	develop	a	meta-
framework	in	my	recent	book,	Heat,	Greed	and	Human	Need:	Climate	change,	capitalism	
and	sustainable	welbeing	(Gough	2017b).	
	
This	contends	that	there	are	only	three	coherent	strategies	to	decarbonise	afluent	societies:		
	
C1.	Ramp	up	eco-eficiency:	the	energy-	and	emissions-eficiency	of	al	economic	activity.		
C2.	‘Recompose’	consumption:	reduce	consumption	emissions	by	switching	from	high-	to	
low-carbon	goods	and	services,	without	necessarily	cutting	overal	consumption	expenditure		
C3.	Degrowth:	reduce	then	stabilise	absolute	levels	of	consumer	demand,	moving	towards	a	
steady	state	economy.	
	
The	second	and	third	strategies	are	designed	to	apply	only	to	rich	countries	to	begin	with.	
But	prioritising	need	satisfaction	also	requires	that	al	three	strategies	take	account	of	their	
distributive	efects	within	societies	–	their	impact	on	minimum	levels	of	need	satisfaction	
and	welbeing	and	the	degree	of	inequality	above	this	level.	This	means	qualifying	the	three	
strategies	as	folows:	
	
C1.	Fair	eco-eficiency:	ensuring,	at	the	very	least,	that	poorer	and	more	vulnerable	groups	
do	not	sufer	from	climate	mitigation	policies	and	that	inequalities	in	income	and	need-
satisfaction	are	not	widened.	
C2.	Fair	recomposition	of	consumption:	ensuring	that	a	‘consumption	corridor’	is	pursued	
between	minimum	consumption	standards,	alowing	every	individual	to	live	a	good	life,	and	
maximum	standards,	ensuring	a	limit	on	every	individual’s	use	of	natural	and	social	
resources	in	order	to	guarantee	a	good	life	for	others	in	the	present	and	in	the	future.	Need	
theory	plays	a	crucial	role	here	in	enabling	a	distinction	to	be	drawn	between	necessities	and	
luxuries.	
C3.	Fair	degrowth:	ensuring	that	the	biophysical	case	for	degrowth	is	not	implemented	at	
the	expense	of	the	ethico-social	case	as	a	path	to	improved	welbeing	and	its	fairer	
distribution.	
	
The	next	section	considers	how	to	introduce	equity	criteria	into	the	eco-eficiency	C1	
scenario	and	the	folowing	section	develops	ideas	and	proposals	on	how	to	implement	a	fair	
recomposition	of	consumption	in	the	C2	scenario.	This	chapter	does	not	address	the	C3	
degrowth	scenario.		
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2.	Inequality,	distribution	and	emissions:	Three	dilemmas	of	the	Plutocene	
	
Climate	change	impacts	unequaly	on	diferent	nations,	groups	and	classes.	And	the	
contribution	of	diferent	nations,	groups	and	classes	to	GHG	emissions	and	climate	change	is	
also	highly	skewed.	Probing	these	issues	reveals	three	contradictions	between	the	
economic,	environmental	and	social	domains	in	the	present	era.	The	section	concludes	by	
arguing	that	tackling	these	dilemmas	requires	augmenting	traditional	redistributive	social	
policy	with	new	forms	of	eco-social	policy.	
	
2.1.	The	double	injustice	
	
Those	nations,	classes	and	groups	least	responsible	for	past	embodied	emissions	are	most	
likely	to	be	adversely	afected	by	climate	change	in	the	near	to	medium	future.	In	previous	
reports	(2007)	the	IPCC	has	concluded	that	climate	change	wil	impact	most	heavily	on	
tropical	and	subtropical	regions,	where	standards	of	living	are	in	general	lower.	In	its	5th	
Report,	the	Commission	is	less	wiling	than	previously	to	draw	together	these	risks	into	an	
overal	global	pattern	of	climate	vulnerability.	However,	it	does	repeat	that	risks	are	
‘generaly	greater	for	disadvantaged	people	and	communities	in	countries	at	al	levels	of	
development’	(IPCC,	2014,	p.	1178).	In	the	developed	world,	lower-income	households	are	
more	likely	to	live	in	higher-risk	areas,	marginal	lands	and	floodplains;	they	have	fewer	
resources	to	cope	and	have	much	lower	rates	of	insurance	cover;	they	also	sufer	from	
poorer	health	and	fewer	resources	which	in	turn	undermines	their	resilience.	In	critical	
moments	of	climate-related	disaster	this	social	dimension	is	brutaly	revealed,	as	with	the	
impact	of	Hurricane	Katrina	in	New	Orleans	in	2005.	The	gravity	of	a	‘natural’	disaster	is	
never	purely	natural.	Social	protection	policies,	safety	nets	and	public	services	can	ofset	
some	of	the	efects.	
	
Turning	to	responsibility	for	emissions,	it	is	important	to	define	who	emits.	The	bulk	of	the	
cumulative	stock	of	CO2	in	the	atmosphere	has	been	contributed	by	the	rich	industrialised	
world:	the	burning	of	fossil	fuels	has	precisely	been	a	major	source	of	their	wealth.	In	recent	
years	the	annual	emissions	of	emerging	market	economies,	most	notably	China,	have	
rocketed	and	overtaken	those	of	the	developed	world,	which	have	remained	stable.	China	is	
now	the	world’s	largest	annual	emitter	of	CO2.	However,	this	trend	is	much	muted	when	we	
measure	national	emissions,	not	on	a	territorial	basis	but	according	to	their	‘consumption	
footprint’.	Consumption-based	emissions	of	the	OECD	countries	are	higher	than	their	
territorial	emissions,	while	those	of	the	rest	of	the	world	are	lower	(Figure	1).	This	reflects	
the	outsourcing	of	manufacturing	and	industry	from	the	West	to	the	East	during	the	period	
of	intense	globalisation	–	and	accompanying	deindustrialisation	in	the	West	–	since	around	
1980.		
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Figure	1.	The	impact	of	a	consumption-based	view	on	emissions	by	country	
Source	House	of	Commons	(2012)	(copyright	acknowledged)	
	
In	addition,	there	are	wide	‘class’	diferences	in	incomes,	wealth	and	emissions	within	every	
country,	hence	new	‘class’	forms	of	double	injustice	multiply.	Bringing	these	two	features	
together,	Figure	2	ilustrates	the	profound	inequity	in	consumption-based	emissions	in	the	
Plutocene.		
Figure	2.	Global	distribution	of	consumption-based	emissions	
Source:	Gore	2015,	Figure	1.		
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2.2.	Inequality	within	rich	countries	drives	emissions	
	
Growing	inequalities	within	countries	may	also	and	independently	push	up	emissions.	
Inequality	increases	status	competition	in	society,	an	effect	first	noted	by	Thorstein	Veblen	
in	The	Theory	of	the	Leisure	Class	published	in	1899,	and	restated	with	cross-national	
evidence	by	Wilkinson	and	Pickett	in	The	Spirit	Level	(2009).	Inequality	spurs	competitive	
consumption,	emulation	efects	and	excessive	consumerism.	It	creates	material	aspirations	
that	cannot	be	scaled	to	everyone	in	a	sustainable	manner.	It	fosters	competition	for	
‘positional’	goods	that	is	both	counterproductive	and	unsustainable.	More	recent	research	
shows	rising	inequality	is	also	associated	with	longer	hours	of	work	and	rising	debt	levels,	
both	of	which	stimulate	consumption	and	emissions	(Frank,	2011;	Pickett	et	al.,	2014;	
Bowles	and	Park	2005;	Laurent	(2015);	Koch	and	Mont	2016).	
	
Related	to	this,	inequality	hinders	colective	action.	Higher	inequality	strengthens	the	power	
of	the	rich	to	make	decisions,	set	agendas,	and	inculcate	selfish	values.	The	rich	wil	have	the	
incentive	and	the	means	to	substitute	private	amenities	for	public	ones,	which	wil	further	
reduce	their	commitments	to	public	provision.	Other	research	shows	that	inequality	
undermines	the	health,	resilience	and	capacities	of	poorer	communities,	which	multiplies	
the	social	damage	due	to	environmental	shocks.	Inequality	downgrades	environmental	
concerns	by	forcing	short-term	time	horizons	on	lower	income	groups.	(Neumayer,	2011)	
(Marmot,	2005),	Laurent,	2015;	Jorgenson	et	al	2016).	
	
Others	however	argue	the	opposite,	that	inequality	can	actualy	reduce	emissions	due	to	
two	factors.	First,	average	propensities	to	consume	and	emit	decline	as	incomes	rise	
(Ravailon	et	al	(2000).	Second,	the	basic	need	satisfiers	or	necessities	of	life	–	food,	
housing,	domestic	energy	and	basic	transport	–	are	almost	everywhere	more	energy-	and	
emissions-intensive	than	other	goods.	Table	1	tabulates	the	expenditure	elasticity	of	
diferent	goods	and	services	in	the	UK	against	their	GHG	emissions	intensity.	It	uses	
expenditure	elasticity	-	the	ratio	of	the	percentage	change	in	expenditure	to	the	percentage	
change	in	household	income	-	as	a	behavioural	indicator	to	distinguish	‘necessities’	from	
non-necessities	or	‘luxuries’.	It	reveals	an	important	paradox:	necessities	are	higher-carbon	
than	‘luxuries’.	The	critical	basic	goods	of	home	energy,	food	and	essential	transport	that	
account	for	around	one	half	of	al	expenditure	on	average,	are	carbon-	and	GHG-intensive,	
while	almost	al	non-necessities,	measured	in	this	way,	are	lower	carbon.		
	
	Table	1:	Categories	of	personal	consumption	by	necessity	and	emission	content,	UK	2009	
Source:	Chitnis	et	al	(2014):	Tables	5,	A.5	
	
	 High	emission	(>1	tonne	
CO2e/£000)	
Low	emission	(<1	tonne	
CO2e/£000)	
‘Necessities’	(expenditure	
elasticity	<1)	
Al	domestic	energy	(electricity,	
gas,	other	fuels)	(31.4%)	
Food	(15.0%)	
	
Other	housing	(2.7%)	
Communication	(1.4%)	
Alcohol/tobacco	(0.8%)	
	
‘Non-necessities’	
(expenditure	elasticity	>1)	
Vehicle	fuels	(5.8%)	
Other	transport	(11.7%)	
Clothing	and	footwear	(3.0%)	
Furnishings	(5.8%)	
Recreation	and	culture	(10.1%)	
Restaurants	and	hotels	(5.8%)	
Private	health	(0.6%)	
Private	education	(0.3%)	
Miscelaneous	(4.9%)	
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Note	1:	The	figures	in	brackets	show	the	shares	of	total	GHG	emissions	accounted	for	by	
each	item.	
Note	2:	A	more	refined	concept	of	necessitousness	is	introduced	in	the	folowing	section.	
	
This	implies	that	higher	inequality	in	a	country	would,	al	other	things	being	equal,	reduce	
consumption	emissions	(Gough	2017b).	At	the	extreme,	the	newly	emerging	plutocratic	
class	in	the	US	and	elsewhere	simply	have	too	much	money	to	spend	and	consume,	however	
many	planes,	yachts	and	mansions	they	own.	By	commandeering	most	of	the	benefits	of	
growth	in	recent	years	they	have	denied	poor	and	middle-income	groups	any	ability	to	
improve	their	consumption	of	necessities.	Though	socialy	regressive	and	repugnant,	such	
hyper-inequality	may	save	on	emissions!	
	
The	theoretical	literature	thus	arrives	at	no	consensus.	However	evidence	is	growing	that	
rising	inequality,	as	measured	by,	for	example,	the	income	share	of	the	top	10%,	
independently	drives	up	consumption	emissions	in	rich	countries:	rising	inequality	drives	
competitive	consumption	and	weakens	solidarity	and	colective	action	to	restrain	emissions.	
In	middle	and	low	income	countries	the	opposite	relation	holds:	where	inequality	is	high	a	
large	share	of	the	population	lives	essentialy	on	the	fringe	of	the	carbon	economy,	thus	
reducing	overal	emissions	(Grunewald	et	al	2017;	Jorgensen	et	al	2016).	In	the	rich	world	
and	taking	other	factors	into	account,	rising	inequality	appears	to	drive	up	emissions.	Since	
the	rich	world	has	higher	consumption	emissions	than	most	of	the	middle	and	low	income	
countries,	this	relationship	matters	more	than	the	reverse	relationship	in	the	other	
countries.	
	
2.3.	The	triple	injustice	
	
Finaly,	climate	mitigation	policies	within	countries	may	themselves	exacerbate	inequalities.	
Studies	reveal	potential	synergies	between	policies	to	stabilise	climate	change	and	to	
enhance	human	welbeing,	again	measured	by	health.	These	include	the	direct	benefits	of	
climate	control,	such	as	reducing	the	direct	impacts	of	drought,	flood	and	heat,	and	co-
benefits,	such	as	reducing	air	polution,	encouraging	active	travel	and	reducing	harmful	
levels	of	consumption	of	red	meat.	
	
However,	studies	also	reveal	potentialy	grave	conflicts	between	human	welbeing	and	
climatic	stability.	For	example,	most	plans	to	reduce	emissions	by	2030	rely	heavily	on	
bioenergy	plus	carbon	capture	and	storage	(BECCS).	Bioenergy	is	energy	derived	from	
biological	sources	or	biomass	-	any	organic	material	which	has	stored	sunlight	in	the	form	of	
chemical	energy.	But	expanding	bioenergy	could	threaten	basic	needs:	by	taking	land	away	
from	food	production	it	threatens	SDG	goal	2	–	ending	hunger	and	achieving	food	security	
for	al,	and	SDG	6	-	universal	and	equitable	access	to	adequate	safe	and	afordable	drinking	
water.	It	could	also	threaten	biodiversity	and	place-specific	livelihoods.	Furthermore,	using	
more	land	for	bioenergy	production	wil,	other	things	being	equal,	raise	the	cost	of	food,	
reduce	real	incomes	and	have	a	major	and	regressive	impact	on	poverty	(SDG	1).	Given	that	
the	share	of	expenditure	devoted	to	basic	food	varies	from	7%	in	the	USA	to	70%	in	Zambia,	
a	major	expansion	of	biomass	could	worsen	both	global	poverty	and	global	inequality	(Farley	
et	al.,	2015).	
	
Across	the	world,	measures	to	increase	the	price	of	carbon	–	an	essential	component	of	
efective	carbon	mitigation	–	wil	be	regressive	in	the	first	instance,	bearing	more	harshly	on	
lower	income	households	and	localities,	as	Table	1	implies	(Gough	et	al	2011).	More	detailed	
studies	show	that	smal	and	‘workless’	households	(retired,	unemployed	or	‘unoccupied’)	
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also	spend	a	higher	share	on	energy.	There	is	evidence	too	that	lower	income	households	on	
average	spend	more	time	at	home	and	thus	have	a	greater	energy	needs	(Druckman	and	
Jackson,	2008;	Gough	et	al,	2011).	So	within	rich	countries	too	carbon	pricing	wil	worsen	the	
distribution	of	income:	not	a	good	position	to	be	in	when	inequalities	are	rising.	This	clash	
between	social	need,	unequal	incomes	and	the	market	pricing	of	energy	can	lead	to	‘energy	
poverty’	or	‘fuel	poverty’.	For	example,	policies	designed	to	improve	energy	eficiency	in	
poor	households	can	actualy	increase	fuel	poverty	when	they	are	financed	by	raising	gas	
and	electricity	tarifs	(Hils	2012,	Gough	2013).	
	
2.4	Some	implications	for	eco-social	policy	in	the	rich	world	
	
The	standard	economics	response	to	these	distributive	impacts	is	to	‘compensate	the	
losers’.	Yet	there	are	profound	problems	with	compensation,	especialy	when	compensating	
households	for	rising	energy	costs.	First,	the	variables	afecting	domestic	energy	eficiency	
cannot	easily	be	addressed	by	existing	social	transfer	programmes,	since	they	encompass	
factors	such	as	the	energy	eficiency	of	dwelings,	urban-rural	diferences	and	connection	to	
energy	networks.	Second,	the	social	security	costs	would	be	expensive	and	they	would	rise	
year	by	year	as	more	ambitious	carbon	reduction	targets	kick	in.	More	people	would	be	
subject	to	means-testing,	so	facing	a	‘poverty	trap’	-	high	marginal	tax	rates	if	their	incomes	
increased;	yet	despite	this	assistance	substantial	numbers	of	low	income	losers	would	
remain,	enough	perhaps	to	spark	a	backlash	against	al	climate	policies.	Third,	the	
compensation	costs	would	soon	exhaust	the	extra	revenue	raised	by	higher	carbon	taxes	
leaving	nothing	to	spare	for	improvements	in	energy	eficiency	and	other	low-carbon	
innovations	(Gough	2017b,	ch	6).	Similar	arguments	apply	in	other	systems	of	provision	such	
as	transport.	
	
Furthermore,	the	message	from	Table	1,	that	most	necessities	are	more	emissions-intensive	
than	most	luxuries,	implies	that	simply	redistributing	income	to	low-income	households	
would,	ceteris	paribus,	raise	rather	than	lower	total	emissions.	Is	there	then	an	equity-
sustainability	dilemma?	The	evidence	suggests	that	this	can	be	overcome,	that		
ceteris	is	rarely	paribus.	First,	in	some	countries,	such	as	Norway	and	Sweden,	carbon	
intensities	for	housing	and	domestic	energy	are	much	lower	than	in	the	UK,	reflecting	the	
extensive	presence	of	district	heating,	biomass,	hydro-electricity	and	better	insulation	in	the	
Nordic	countries	(Kerkhof	et	al.	2009).	Diferent	forms	of	technology	and	infrastructure	can	
profoundly	afect	the	eco-eficiency	of	specific	sectors	and	thus	the	potential	trade-of	
between	equity	and	sustainability	pictured	in	Table	1.	Second,	recent	research	on	household	
emissions	in	the	US	suggests	the	trade-of	is	smal.	Sagar	(2017)	concludes	that	if	the	US	had	
the	same	income	distribution	as	Sweden	–	a	huge	change	–	CO2	emissions	from	private	
households	would	be	only	1.5%	higher.	This	is	manageable	if	new	eco-social	programmes	
are	put	into	place.	These	findings	help	reconcile	the	apparent	equity-sustainability	dilemma	
in	Table	1	with	the	conclusion	of	section	2.2	above	that	inequality	drives	up	emissions	in	rich	
countries.		
	
The	consensus	among	social	policy	experts	is	that	compensation	plans	are	both	technicaly	
and	politicaly	very	dificult	to	achieve.	Since	compensation	policies	wil	not	be	suficient	and	
could	be	counter-productive,	new	forms	of	‘eco-social	policy’	within	each	strategy	are	
required	that	serve	both	equity	and	sustainability	goals.	The	model	of	social	policy	needs	to	
change,	as	ilustrated	below.	Instead	of	reactive	and	countervailing	social	policies,	there	is	a	
need	for	proactive,	integrated	‘eco-social’	policies:	
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Climate	mitigation	policies	->	distributional	dilemmas	->	redistributive	social	policies	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	
Eco-social	policies	
	
	
In	the	important	field	of	housing	and	domestic	energy,	this	points	to	two	basic	eco-social	
solutions.	First,	social	energy	tarifs:	introduce	lower	tarifs	for	initial	units	of	electricity	or	
gas	consumed,	and	higher	tarifs	for	successive	units.	This	would	recognize	the	basic	need	
component	of	the	first	block	of	household	energy	and	the	progressive	choice	element	in	
successive	units.	The	total	average	price	of	domestic	energy	would	continue	to	rise	over	
time,	as	part	of	the	carbon	pricing	strategy,	but	the	distribution	of	the	burden	would	be	
skewed	more	to	higher	consumption	households	and	luxury	use	of	energy.	It	would	be	
difficult	to	administer	in	the	privatised	energy	system	of	most	countries	today	and	is	
opposed	by	energy	suppliers.		
	
Second,	and	most	important,	a	massive	rol-out	of	‘Green	New	Deal’	programes		(NEF	
2008).	These	would	reduce	carbon	emissions	by	investing	in	renewable	energy	and	
deploying	radical	conservation	measures,	whilst	boosting	demand	and	employment	
opportunities,	via,	for	example,	creating	and	training	a	‘carbon	army’	of	workers	to	achieve	
the	reconstruction	and	house	retrofitting	programme.	Germany	has	the	most	ambitious	
programme	of	this	kind	in	Europe	(Power	and	Zulauf,	2011).	Yet	the	German	Feed-in	Tarif	
(FiT)	programme	recreates	some	new	distributive	dilemmas:	it	clearly	benefits	the	top	30%	
of	households	and	richer	farmers	(Hüther,	2013).	Given	the	impact	on	general	electricity	
prices	the	overal	impact	remains	regressive.	However,	in	a	dynamic	context,	the	FiT	has	
proved	invaluable	in	retrofitting	houses	and	in	building	up	Germany’s	solar	panel	industry.		
	
In	conclusion,	new	forms	of	triple	injustice	can	be	continualy	recreated	in	unequal	societies.	
To	deal	with	these	a	more	fundamental	strategy	is	required.		
	
3.	Eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	
3.1	Consumption	and	welfare	
	
The	distinction	between	a	C1	and	C2	approach	has	paralels	with	national	income	
accounting.	This	seems	counter-intuitive,	given	that	national	income	accounting	is	
notoriously	hopeless	as	a	measure	of	welbeing	and	ignores	the	entire	household	economy,	
civil	society	and	the	stil	broader	‘core	economy’.	However,	national	income	accounting	has	
one	great	merit:	it	provides	three	distinct	methods	for	calculating	the	value	of	an	economy’s	
gross	domestic	product	or	GDP,	which	should	deliver	the	same	answer.	These	methods	are:	
• to	sum	the	monetary	value	added	by	al	enterprises	in	the	economy	
• to	sum	the	incomes	generated	in	the	economy	
• to	sum	expenditures	in	the	economy	on	final	outputs		
	
These	distinct	methods	in	turn	imply	three	distinct	targets	for	public	policy	to	act	upon:	
1. the	quantum	and	eficiency	of	production:	broadly	the	scope	of	economic	policy	
2. the	distribution	of	incomes:	broadly	the	scope	of	social	policy	
3. the	composition	of	consumption:	the	target	of	a	novel	range	of	policies	that	I	wil	
cal	‘recomposition’.		
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The	goals	of	eficiency	and	growth	remain	the	mainstay	of	economic	policy.	After	the	Second	
World	War,	a	‘social	settlement’	in	the	developed	world	qualified	capitalism	with	the	
auxiliary	goal	of	equity	and	redistribution:	the	policy	domain	of	‘welfare	states’.	The	urgent	
need	now	is	for	a	new	social	settlement	adding	a	third	goal:	sustainable	consumption.	This	
would	address	the	composition	of	national	expenditure:	between	private	consumption,	
public	consumption	and	investment,	and	within	each	of	these	categories.	Two	critical	
dimensions	in	this	debate	would	be	the	environmental	impact	of	diferent	expenditures	but	
also	their	‘necessitousness’,	whether	they	are	essential,	desirable	or	wasteful.	This	takes	us	
back	to	need	theory.	
	
This	third	goal	is	not	as	novel	as	it	seems.	In	practice,	post-war	welfare	states	have	been	
more	complex	and	diferentiated	than	the	common	opposition	of	eficiency	and	equity	
implies.	It	is	more	helpful	to	see	social	policy	comprising	three	sets	of	activities,	as	in	Table	2.	
	
Table	2.	Ideal	generic	goals	and	activities	of	social	policy	
Welfare	goals	 Welfare	policies	
S1	Redistribution	of	income	Guarantee	a	minimum	income	floor;	reduce	inequality	
S2	Social	consumption	 Provide	vital	need	satisfiers	and	discourage	‘bads’	
S3	Social	investment		 Develop	human	and	social	capabilities		
Source:	Gough	2017b,	Table	5.1	
	
Alongside	social	transfers	(S1),	social	democratic	welfare	states	deliver	social	consumption	
services	(S2)	and	social	investment	policies	(S3),	which	together	account	for	about	one	half	
of	public	social	expenditure.	In	addition,	unrecognised	by	expenditure	accounts,	there	is	a	
raft	of	other	interventions	relevant	to	meeting	needs,	such	as	labour	market	policies	of	al	
kinds	and	regulatory	policies	impacting	firms,	households	and	other	actors.	Despite	ongoing	
cuts,	privatisation,	contracting	out,	commodification	and	deregulation,	welfare	states	
continue	to	provide,	finance	and	regulate	for	an	alternative,	broadly	needs-based	delivery	of	
money,	services	and	capabilities.	Thus,	right	from	the	start	we	can	note	that	social	policy	is	
heavily	involved	in	recomposing	consumption	(C2).	
	
I	am	proposing	an	expansion	of	public	debate	and	intervention	around	private	consumption.	
This	is	a	more	radical	step.	It	appears	to	chalenge	a	basic	freedom	of	modern	consumer	
societies.	It	chalenges	a	fundamental	principle	of	welfare	economics,	that	individuals	are	
the	best	judges	of	their	own	preferences	or	wants,	and	that	what	is	consumed	should	be	
determined	by	the	private	consumption	preferences	of	individuals.	It	immediately	raises	
concerns	about	interference	by	experts,	oficials	or	politicians	in	the	intimate	lives	of	
citizens.	How	can	such	a	programme	be	envisaged	in	a	democratic	society?		
	
A	starting	point	is	to	recognise	the	lack	of	realism	of	the	orthodox	economic	theory	of	
consumers	as	rational	and	informed	individuals	with	ordered	sets	of	preferences	
uninfluenced	by	external	factors.	This	model	has	long	been	rejected	by	behavioural	
economics	that	recognises	gaps	in	knowledge,	the	importance	of	inertia	and	the	role	of	
‘satisficing’	in	consumer	behaviour	and	thus	countenances	‘nudging’	and	changes	in	choice	
architecture	to	alter	consumers’	incentives	and	behaviour.	But	this	too	is	insuficient.	
Sociologists	have	shown	that	behaviours	are	shaped	by	wider	‘social	practices’,	such	as	daily	
showering	or	patterns	of	food	purchasing,	reflecting	diferent	identities	and	social	norms.	
Beyond	these	are	political	economy	explanations	that	recognise	the	pervasive	power	of	
corporations	and	advertising	to	engineer	novel	and	ever-expanding	consumption	
commodities.	And	finaly,	there	are	stil	broader	systems	of	provision,	such	as	the	spatial	lay-
out	of	cities,	largely	outside	the	scope	of	consumer	influence.	
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It	is	not	surprising	that	by	contrast	many	writers	on	sustainable	consumption	speak	of	‘an	
iron	cage	of	consumerism’	imprisoning	consumers	(Jackson	2009).	This	is	too	strong	an	
image:	new	market	players	can	enter	and	generational	shifts	in	tastes	can	occur.	But	there	
can	be	no	doubt	that	corporate	power,	system	‘lock-in’	and	the	interaction	between	the	two	
profoundly	undermine	the	neo-classical	justification	for	untrammeled	consumer	behaviour.	
This	is	increasingly	recognised	in	contemporary	policy	areas,	such	as	the	public	provision	and	
regulation	of	medical	services,	and	the	blitzkrieg	of	regulations,	taxes	and	shaming	that	
surrounds	smoking	today.	
	 	
3.2	Making	the	case	for	a	‘consumption	corridor’	
	
Now	the	imperative	need	to	restrain	and	reverse	environmental	degradation	has	brought	
consumption	back	onto	the	agenda.	To	recompose	consumption	fairly	entails	making	a	
distinction	between	goods	and	services	that	are	necessary	for	a	basic	level	of	welbeing,	and	
those	that	are	surplus	to	this	requirement.	By	prioritising	the	former,	need	theory	provides	
a	bridge	to	relate	social,	global	and	intergenerational	justice	(Gough	2015a).	To	achieve	a	
safe	and	just	space	for	humanity	requires	addressing	not	only	basic	needs,	minimum	
incomes	and	necessities,	but	also	riches,	luxuries	and	maximum	incomes.	In	the	language	of	
Giulio	and	Fuchs	(2014),	we	must	pursue	the	idea	of	a	sustainable	‘consumption	corridor’	
between	minimum	standards,	alowing	every	individual	to	live	a	satisfactory	life,	and	
maximum	standards,	ensuring	a	limit	on	every	individual’s	use	of	natural	and	social	
resources	in	order	to	guarantee	a	good	life	for	others	in	the	present	and	in	the	future.	I	wil	
look	at	each	in	turn.	
	
A	decent	minimum	consumption	standard.	Social	policy	research	provides	us	with	a	sound	
basis	for	identifying	necessities	in	any	particular	social	context.	Since	Peter	Townsend’s	work	
on	poverty	(1979),	there	has	been	wide	acceptance	that	inability	to	participate	in	accepted	
social	activities	is	the	defining	feature	of	poverty	or	social	exclusion.	But	what	participation	
entails	wil	be	conceived,	specified	and	measured	diferently	in	diferent	societies.	This	can	
be	identified	using	citizen	focus	groups	advised	by	various	‘experts’.	For	example,	the	2014	
MIS	(Minimum	Income	Standard)	study	in	the	UK	involved	12	focus	groups	in	which	
members	of	the	public	from	a	range	of	social	backgrounds	were	tasked	with	producing	lists	
of	items	that	households	would	need	in	order	to	reach	‘an	acceptable	minimum	standard	of	
living’.	An	impressive	consensus	has	built	up	on	what	this	consumption	bundle	consists	of.	
The	dual	strategy	methodology	is	now	being	overtly	applied	to	estimate	‘decent	living’	
standards	across	many	EU	member	states	(Storms	2013;	Gough	2017,	chapter	7).	
	
Devising	a	maximum	income	line:	defining	luxuries.	Herman	Daly	(1977)	was	an	early	
advocate	of	instituting	a	maximum	income	as	part	of	a	steady	state	economy,	an	idea	he	
continues	to	repeat:	‘If	you	have	a	limited	total,	and	you	also	have	a	minimum	income,	then	
that	implies	a	maximum	somewhere’	(Daly	2018:	90).	Since	then	cals	for	a	maximum	
income	or	‘riches	line’	have	grown	though	often	without	a	coherent	ethical	or	sociological	
basis.	But	new	thinking	among	political	philosophers,	sustainability	economists	and	others	is	
gradualy	emerging.	Ingrid	Robeyns	(2018),	for	example,	makes	the	case	for	a	‘non-intrinsic	
limitarianism’	–	the	belief	that	it	is	not	permissible	to	have	more	resources	than	are	needed	
to	fuly	flourish	in	life.	To	justify	this	she	considers	three	arguments:	the	arguments	of	unmet	
urgent	needs,	of	democracy	and	legitimacy,	and	of	ecological	sustainability.	I	wil	consider	
each	in	turn.	
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First,	riches	should	not	be	accrued	at	the	expense	of	unmet	basic	needs.	Medeiros’s	(2006)	
redistributive	method	to	calculate	a	maximum	income	line	elegantly	operationalises	this	
principle.	Beginning	with	the	minimum	income	line	it	calculates	a	riches	line	‘which	delimits	
the	accumulated	resources	necessary	for	the	eradication	of	poverty’.	It	calculates	what	sum	
of	money	it	would	take	to	move	everyone	above	the	acceptable	income	threshold,	and	then	
considers	at	what	salary	al	higher	earnings	would	provide	that	sum.	Using	this	method	a	
recent	estimate	for	the	UK	by	Hirsch	(2017)	arrives	at	a	riches	line	of	about	£150,000	per	
person	per	year.	If	al	incomes	above	this	rate	were	taxed	at	100%	the	money	raised	would	
be	suficient	to	bring	al	UK	citizens	up	to	the	‘minimum	income	standard’	–	a	needs-based	
standard	considerably	higher	than	the	oficial	poverty	line.	This	has	some	intuitive	
plausibility:	it	is	the	income	at	which	the	top	rate	of	tax	commences,	and	is	the	salary	of	the	
UK	Prime	Minister.		
	
The	second	argument	for	establishing	a	maximum	limit	would	require	a	more	democratic,	
colaborative	and	disaggregated	approach	to	defining	luxuries.	It	would	apply	the	dual	
strategy	method	to	discussing	conditions	for	flourishing	in	a	specific	national	context.	
Planned	research	projects	tend	to	focus	on	size	of	home,	material	goods	in	the	home,	
savings/insurance,	leisure	activities,	type	of	car	and	possible	life	choices.	Citizen	forums	
comprising	diferent	income	groups	and	classes	would	be	tasked	with	reaching	a	consensus	
on	what	bundle	of	goods	and	services	would	enable	a	flourishing	or	prosperous	life.	If	this	
can	be	agreed,	then	we	could	identify	a	maximum	bundle	and	a	maximum	income/wealth	
line	above	this	level.	Such	possessions	would	be	seen	as	luxuries	and	riches	and	would	be	
seen	to	lack	legitimacy.2		
	
For	our	purposes	it	is	the	third	test	which	is	crucial:	what	bundle	of	consumer	commodities	
contributing	to	flourishing	or	prosperity	would	be	possible	within	current	planetary	
boundaries?	For	example,	what	consumption	levels	and	patterns	would	stay	within	a	safe	
emissions	level?	To	determine	this	level	a	more	demanding	dual	strategy	would	be	needed,	
whereby	sustainability	experts	provide	indicators	of	the	carbon	and	GHG	footprints	of	
diferent	consumption	items	to	inform	and	guide	citizen	discussions	on	what	was	and	was	
not	acceptable.	It	is	highly	likely	that	this	ecological	maximum	limit	would	lie	below,	possibly	
wel	below,	both	the	redistributive	and	the	legitimacy	limits	discussed	above.	
	
To	devise	and	implement	a	luxury	or	riches	line	is	a	demanding	task	for	many	reasons.	To	
move	to	2	tonnes	of	emissions	within	existing	socio-technical	structures	would	deprive	
citizens	of	a	vast	range	of	goods	and	services	-	cars,	imported	foods,	a	range	of	clothing	and	
diets	etc	-	that	they	have	agreed	are	necessary	for	efective	participation	in	modern	life.	In	
Finland,	even	people	receiving	minimum	income	benefits	exceed	ecologicaly	sustainable	
lifestyles	by	a	wide	margin	(Hirvilammi	et	al	2013).	This	is	to	be	expected:	C2	policies	
complement	but	don’t	replace	C1	policies.		
3.3	Eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	
	
Initiatives	to	recompose	consumption	wil	necessarily	be	colective	and	there	is	growing	
evidence	that	these	wil	be	most	successful	in	sub-national	communities,	whether	cities,	
towns	or	vilages.	Meaningful	participation	within	localities	encourages	longer-term	and	
joined–up	thinking,	bringing	together	singular	technologies	to	provide	‘transformative	
networks	of	innovation’	(Steward	2012;	Jackson	and	Victor	(2013).	Decarbonising	our	
																												
2	We	intend	to	begin	pilot	studies	in	2019	to	test	whether	this	is	the	case.	
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economies	and	our	way	of	life	can	never	be	achieved	by	simply	new	technology:	it	requires	a	
network	of	transformations	that	are	more	readily	conceived	and	perceived	on	a	smaler	
human	scale,	such	as	CRAGs	(Carbon	Rationing	Action	Groups)	and	transition	towns	in	the	
UK	(Howel,	2012;	Whitmarsh,	2011,	Seyfang	and	Haxeltine	2013).	
But	in	view	of	overwhelming	power	imbalances,	consumption	lock-in	and	growing	
inequality,	it	is	evident	that	recomposing	consumption	wil	require,	in	addition,	some	hefty	
top-down	state	interventions.	It	wil	need	a	range	of	novel	C2	programmes	to	recompose	
consumption	in	a	fair	way:	an	enlarged	suite	of	‘eco-social	policies’	that	simultaneously	and	
explicitly	pursue	both	equity/justice	and	sustainability/	suficiency	goals.	These	are	discussed	
in	detail	in	my	book	(Gough	2017b).	I	highlight	just	three	here:	smart	VAT,	wider	social	
consumption,	and	reduced	work-time.	
Taxing	high-carbon	luxuries:	smart	value-added	tax.	In	al	OECD	countries	except	the	USA	
there	exists	an	explicit	tax	on	consumption—value-added	tax	(VAT)—that	raises	about	a	fifth	
of	al	tax	revenues	and	is	a	major	funder	of	social	programmes.	The	VAT	rate	in	most	EU	
countries	today	varies	between	20%	and	25%,	but	in	al	countries	there	are	exemptions	and	
lower	rates	applied	to	certain	goods	and	services.	The	argument	for	a	‘smart	VAT’	is	to	
introduce	deliberate	variations	in	the	rate,	higher	to	discourage	bad	consumption	and	lower	
to	encourage	desirable	consumption	(Fel	2016).	The	proposal	has	mainly	been	advocated	
on	health	and	wel-being	grounds,	to	improve	healthy	eating	and	discourage	obesity.	But	it	
could	also	be	amended	to	take	account	of	sustainability.	Thus	high-GHG	goods	that	harmed	
wel-being	would	attract	the	highest	VAT	rates,	while	low-carbon	goods	that	improve	wel-
being	would	be	taxed	at	lower	or	even	negative	rates	(amounting	to	a	subsidy).	To	decide	
what	goods	are	virtuous	and	what	harmful	Fel	proposes	regular	deliberative	dialogue	in	
focus	groups	informed	by	environmental	and	social	experts.	Smart	VAT	provides	a	broad	
framework	within	which	other	proposals	to	tax	high-carbon	non-essentials	could	fit,	such	as	
a	frequent	flyer	levy	or	a	global	tax	on	business-class	flights	(Chancel	and	Piketty	2014).	
	
Widening	social	consumption.	There	are	several	reasons	for	raising	the	share	of	state	social	
consumption	as	part	of	an	eco-social	strategy.	First,	tax-financed	social	consumption	such	as	
health	services,	social	care	and	education	is	inherently	redistributive:	alocation	according	to	
need,	risk	or	citizenship,	not	market	demand,	automaticaly	serves	redistributive	social	
goals—even	if	the	tax	system	is	neutral	rather	than	progressive.	Second,	research	suggests	
that	this	saves	carbon.	For	example,	the	US	healthcare	system	directly	accounts	for	8%	of	
emissions	in	the	USA,	compared	with	3%	of	UK	emissions	directly	stemming	from	the	NHS.	
This	is	due	both	to	the	greater	macro-eficiency	and	lower	expenditure	shares	of	health	in	
the	UK,	but	also	to	lower	emissions	per	pound	or	dolar	spent,	due	to	better	alocation	of	
resources	and	procurement	practices	and	to	explicit	carbon-saving	programmes	(Gough	
2017b).3	
	
Reducing	paid	work	time.	A	redistribution	of	time	would	contribute	to	recomposing	
consumption	and	deliver	eco-social	benefits.	It	would	enhance	‘discretionary	time’	-	time	
left	over	after	the	necessary	time	spent	in	wage	labour,	unpaid	household	labour	and	
personal	care	-	and	contribute	to	autonomy	and	welbeing	(Goodin	et	al	2008).	Moreover	
evidence	is	growing	that	RWT	can	make	a	major	contribution	to	a	sustainable	environment	
																												
3	The	idea	of	Universal	Basic	Services	generalizes	this	approach,	though	not	on	carbon	
grounds	(IGP	2017).	There	is	a	case	for	public	provision	or	guarantees	of	access	for	a	wider	
range	of	life’s	necessities,	beyond	the	staples	of	the	welfare	state,	including	for	example	
food,	housing	and	transport.	This,	rather	than	Universal	Basic	Income,	would	contribute	to	
sustainability	and	greater	equality	(and	eficiency).	
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and	climate	(Schor	2005,	Coote	and	Franklin	2013;	Gough	2017b).	Since	1975,	when	they	
had	similar	hours	of	work,	the	US	has	reduced	average	hours	by	4	per	cent	and	Germany	by	
22	per	cent.	Al	other	things	being	equal,	Germany	has	deployed	its	productivity	dividend	in	
a	less	environmentaly	harmful	way	than	the	United	States.	RWT	achieves	this	in	two	ways:	it	
can	change	the	time	and	expenditure	budgets	of	households	in	a	lower-carbon	direction	
(the	composition	efect)	and	it	weakens	the	‘work	and	spend’	cycle,	which	locks	employees	
into	a	trajectory	of	fixed	hours	and	rising	consumption	(the	scale	efect).	Both	contribute	to	
our	C2	goal	and	the	latter	provides	a	transition	to	the	C3	goal.	But	both	need	to	be	
accompanied	by	supportive	economic,	labour	and	social	policies	to	ensure	that	lower-
income	households	do	not	sufer,	that	the	transition	is	fair.	
	
One	way	or	another,	the	composition	of	consumption	must	enter	political	debate	and	the	
policy	arsenal	in	an	explicit	way.	Social	policy	should	not	be	concerned	only	with	equity	and	
distributive	issues.	In	the	age	of	the	Anthropocene,	social	policy	must	be	about	changing	
patterns	of	consumption	as	wel	as	redistributing	incomes.	
	
Conclusion	
	
Green	growth,	or	raising	eco-eficiency,	wil	not	sufice	in	the	face	of	dangerous	climate	
change	for	two	reasons:	it	cannot	succeed	alone	in	reducing	the	cumulative	stock	of	
greenhouse	gases	fast	enough	and	it	pays	little	or	no	attention	to	issues	of	fairness	and	
justice,	either	between	countries	or	within	countries.	This	chapter	reverts	to	a	concept	in	the	
Brundtland	Report	on	sustainable	development	–	that	of	common	human	needs	–	which	I	
argue	provides	the	crucial	foundation	for	a	just	transition	to	a	sustainable	low-carbon	world.	
After	establishing	a	theoretical	framework	to	define	and	operationalise	human	needs,	the	
first	section	concludes	by	distinguishing	three	very	broad	strategies	within	rich	countries	to	
limit	climate	change	in	a	just	way:	fair	eco-eficiency,	fair	sustainable	consumption,	and	fair	
degrowth.	This	chapter	focuses	only	on	the	first	two.	The	second	part	introduces	inequality,	
to	reflect	the	influence	of	the	rising	inequality	of	income	and	wealth	on	the	distribution	of	
consumption-based	emissions	between	and	within	countries;	a	phenomenon	some	have	
labeled	the	Plutocene.	This	environment	intensifies	certain	dilemmas	between	the	goals	of	
justice/equity	and	sustainability,	which	require	new	forms	of	eco-social	policy	to	overcome.	
	
The	third	section	makes	the	case	for	‘recomposing	consumption’	by	returning	to	need	
theory.	Necessities	can	be	distinguished	from	luxuries	and	this	enables	us	to	envisage	and	
target	a	fair	‘consumption	corridor’	between	minimum	and	maximum	consumption	levels.	
To	achieve	this	in	a	democratic	society,	I	argue,	wil	require	new	forms	of	deliberative	citizen	
forums	caling	upon	expert	advice.	To	this	end	three	further	eco-social	policies	are	
advocated	to	shift	rich	countries	towards	more	sustainable	consumption	practices.	None	of	
this	wil	be	easy,	but	recomposing	consumption	in	rich	countries	could	provide	a	strategic	
and	more	just	bridge	between	a	dangerous	present	and	the	seemingly	impossible	future	of	
degrowth.	
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Practical	proposals	
1. Establish	a	public	statutory	body	independent	of	government	with	the	remit	to	pursue	
sustainable	and	socialy	just	practices,	monitor	policy	formation	across	departments,	and	
evaluate	and	publicly	comment	on	progress	and	its	obstacles.	How	to	do	this	wil	vary	
and	we	need	cross-national	studies	here.	
From	a	UK	perspective	this	could	be	based	on	the	Sustainable	Development	Commission	
(SDC),	abolished	in	2010.	Other	UK	models	are	the	UK	Climate	Change	Committee,	the	
Equalities	and	Human	Rights	Commission,	and	the	Welsh	Commission	for	Future	
Generations.	
2. To	achieve	equitable	and	just	eco-eficiency	(C1):	
a. Bring	back	into	plural	forms	of	colective	ownership	(state,	municipal,	
cooperative	etc)	al	privatised	basic	utilities,	including	energy	and	water.	
b. Revamp	Green	New	Deal	proposals	starting	with	social	housing,	low	eficiency	
housing	and	housing	in	deprived	areas.	
c. Introduce	social	tarifs	for	energy	and	water.	
3. Eco-social	policies	to	recompose	consumption	(C2):	
a. Expand	the	scope	and	extent	of	public	service	delivery	of	basic	need	services.	
Aim	for	Universal	Basic	Services	as	an	alternative	vision	to	Universal	Basic	
Income	
b. Establish	deliberative	citizen	forums	to	try	to	achieve	consensus	on	a)	
sustainable	maximum	incomes,	b)	sustainable	maximum	bundles	of	consumer	
goods	
c. Introduce	smart	VAT	with	higher	rates	on	unsustainable	luxuries	
d. Facilitate	and	encourage	through	colective	bargaining	and	individual	options	
opportunities	to	reduce	paid	work	time	
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